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Abstract
In this paper I provide a methodological critique of the conventional method for
assessing the impact of investment shortfalls and other contributors to unfunded
pension liabilities, and offer a methodologically sound replacement with substantive
policy implications. The conventional method – simply summing the annual actuarial
gain/loss figures over time – provides a neat, additive decomposition of the sources of
the rise in the Unfunded Accrued Liability (UAL). In doing so, however, it implicitly
assumes that in the counterfactual exercise, amortization would adjust dollar-for-dollar
with the interest on additional UAL. That is, even if the total (and average) shortfall from
covering interest is substantial, the marginal shortfall is assumed to be zero. This is not
how contribution shortfalls arise under funding formulas typically used by public plans in
the United States. Using the actual funding formula in the counterfactual – with
contribution shortfalls on the margin -- leads to much higher estimates of the UAL
impact of investment shortfalls than the conventional method. The reason is that there
are large interactions over time between investment shortfalls and marginal contribution
shortfalls. The conventional counterfactual implicitly assumes away these interactions.
The resulting additivity is alluring, but illusory.
The conventional method also leads to untenable results on other UAL-drivers. Most
striking is the implication that the cumulative UAL impact of pension obligation bonds
(POB’s) is no different from the initial impact of receiving the proceeds, independent of
the return (actual or assumed) on those proceeds.
The underlying problem with the conventional framework is that it has emerged without
careful attention to the counterfactual scenarios it is meant to address. This paper
provides explicit and internally consistent counterfactuals to better understand the
conventional method and its flaws, as well as the reasons for using instead the actual
amortization formula in the counterfactual. Mathematical methods are used to
illuminate the theoretical issues that lie behind any simulations.
The analytical results are illustrated empirically with an adapted version of the actuarial
history of the Connecticut State Teachers’ Retirement System (CSTRS), FY00-FY14.
The example is instructive because it is a highly underfunded system, notable for its
high (and unreduced) assumed rate of return (8.5 percent), as well as its use of $2
billion in POB proceeds to reduce the UAL in FY08, just before the market crash.
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Introduction and Summary
What has been the impact of investment shortfalls from the assumed return on public
pension funds, over extended periods? How has this impact compared with that of
shortfalls from liability assumptions and contribution shortfalls? These questions have
been framed as the relative contributions of the investment, liability, and contribution
shortfalls to the rise of a plan’s Unfunded Accrued Liability (UAL). That framework, in
turn, has been based on the actuarial gain/loss statement in a plan’s annual valuation
report, which parcels out the year’s rise in UAL among the UAL-drivers. In the
conventional multi-period UAL analysis (Munnell, et. al., 2015), these one-year gain/loss
attributions are simply added up over time. In this paper, I closely scrutinize the
methodological basis for this procedure and find it wanting. I propose a
methodologically sound replacement with substantive policy implications.
The critical step in the conventional methodology is the last step -- adding up the annual
gain/loss components of the rise in UAL over a period of years to arrive at a cumulative
breakdown of the multi-year rise in UAL. While this procedure provides a neat, additive
decomposition of the rise in UAL, it does so by effectively assuming away important
interactions between investment shortfalls and contribution shortfalls, through its implicit
assumption regarding the counterfactual behavior of amortization payments.
Specifically, the method implicitly assumes that the one-year impact of any UAL-driver
elicits in the following year a dollar-for-dollar increase in amortization payments for the
interest on the additional UAL. That is, even if the total (and average) shortfall from
covering interest is substantial, the marginal shortfall is assumed to be zero. This is not
how contribution shortfalls arise under funding formulas typically used by public plans in
the United States. In these formulas amortization is proportional to the UAL (and its
interest), so the average and marginal shortfall (if there is one) is the same.
Using the actual funding formula in the counterfactual can lead to much higher
estimates of the UAL impact of investment shortfalls than the conventional method.
The reason is that there are large interactions over time between investment shortfalls
and marginal contribution shortfalls. The conventional counterfactual implicitly
assumes away these interactions, with a resulting additivity that is alluring, but illusory.
It is important to get the impact of investment shortfalls right, not only for academic
reasons, but also for practical policy purposes. In the aftermath of the 2007-09 market
crash, many funds reduced their assumed returns, but not by much (0.27 percent, on
1

average, Biggs, 2015). Several years later, despite generally strong market returns, the
question returns, as in many cases the cuts have proven insufficient to prevent a further
rise in UAL’s. Thus, pension funds – and the general public – need to understand the
historical impact of investment shortfalls to better inform the choice of rate reduction
going forward. By underestimating the past impact, the conventional method implies a
low-ball answer to the question of how much to cut the assumed return.
The conventional method also leads to untenable results on other UAL-drivers. Most
striking is the implication that the cumulative UAL impact of pension obligation bonds
(POB’s) is no different from the initial impact of receiving the proceeds. If a state
issues POB’s to “pay down,” say, $2 billion in a fund’s UAL (as did Connecticut for its
teachers’ retirement system in 2008) the plan’s annual gain/loss statement will record a
$2 billion reduction in UAL due to the POB. In the conventional multi-year UAL
analysis, the cumulative impact of that POB remains at $2 billion for every year
thereafter. In this framework, there is no impact attributed to the POB of the assumed
or actual return on the proceeds invested in the fund (let alone the debt incurred and
debt service paid by the state or other issuer of the POB’s). This treatment of POB’s in
the conventional multi-year UAL analysis is, perhaps, the canary in the coal mine,
raising questions of the attribution to the other UAL-drivers as well.
The underlying problem with the conventional framework is that it has emerged without
careful attention to the counterfactual scenarios it is meant to address, such as, “What if
investment returns had met assumptions, but other factors had remained unchanged?”
In general, such scenarios take as the baseline the time series of all UAL-drivers at their
actual values (generating the actual rise in UAL), and assesses the counterfactual
impact of setting the series of each driver, one at a time, at the value that generates no
rise in UAL. This is what policy-makers have in mind for the “what-if” scenarios.
Concretely, it is the specification of the UAL-drivers that defines the exercise. Formally,
that specification defines what is exogenous. In the conventional decomposition (based
on the annual gain/loss statement), a key driver is the total dollar amount of the
contribution shortfall – the difference between interest on the prior year’s UAL and the
current year’s amortization. Taking this as exogenous for a one-year change is
innocuous, but not for multiple years. For if so, then current amortization varies dollarfor-dollar with the interest on the prior year’s UAL. That is, the implicit assumption for is
that in each year, amortization equals interest on the counterfactual UAL for the prior
year, minus the current year’s actual contribution shortfall, impounded in an exogenous
constant term. In this way, the total contribution shortfall reproduces the actual, but the
marginal shortfall is set to zero. In actual practice, the marginal and average shortfall (if
there is one) are typically the same. This is the crux of the problem.
A second issue with the conventional framework is that the counterfactual time series of
asset values is endogenous, but is implicitly treated as exogenous. One can readily
2

rectify this, treating asset values as endogenous. Otherwise, the counterfactuals are
not internally consistent. Although this has no effect on the measured impact of
investment shortfalls, it can significantly improve the measured impact of POB’s.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, I review the analytics behind the
conventional method. I then briefly discuss the implications for this procedure of
smoothed vs. market valuation. Next, I dissect the key issue of the implicit designation
of what is exogenous under the conventional method, and how its counterfactual model
of amortization is at odds with actual formulas. I then informally draw the implications
for the conventional method’s under/overestimation of the impact of investment
shortfalls and other drivers. Before continuing, I correct the exogenous treatment of
asset values so that the analysis proceeds with internally consistent counterfactuals.
Next, to fully illuminate the implications of what is taken as exogenous, I mathematically
contrast the two extremes: the conventional framework’s exogenous treatment of the
total contribution shortfall vs. exogenous amortization payments. I then illustrate my
proposed method of using actual amortization formulas, which, in the case of
underfunding, lies between the two extremes previously analyzed. To complement our
understanding of the varying impact of investment shortfalls on the UAL under the
different amortization assumptions, I show that the difference is mirrored in the impact
on cumulative contributions, with the total impact – paid (amortization) and not-yet-paid
(UAL) -- essentially invariant. Finally, for completeness sake, I fill out the accounting for
POB’s, including the debt and debt service of the bonds’ issuer.
It is important to note that when using the amortization formulas, the UAL impact of
individual drivers will exceed the actual rise in the UAL, in the case of underfunding.
That is, there are substantial interactions that are effectively assumed away under the
conventional framework. The reason is that if investment shortfalls generate additional
UAL, the interest on that additional UAL will, in underfunded systems, also be
underfunded, adding further to the UAL. These dynamic interactions between
investment shortfalls and contribution shortfalls will disrupt additivity. I argue that the
adding-up problem is more aesthetic than policy-relevant. It is more important to get the
individual impacts right, taken one at a time, since that is the usual policy interest. If the
policy interest is in the simultaneous impact of multiple drivers, that can be readily
modeled, reflecting the interactions, rather than effectively assuming away the
interactions so that the individual impacts artificially add up.
Throughout the paper, I supplement the analytical results with illustrations adapted from
the Connecticut State Teachers’ Retirement System (CSTRS), FY00-FY14. The
CSTRS case is of interest in its own right for several reasons. The system’s pension
funding difficulties rival those of more well-known cases such as California, New Jersey,
Illinois and Pennsylvania. Unlike other systems, it has not reduced its assumed rate of
return from 8.5 percent. Finally, it has made use of POB’s to reduce its reported UAL.
3

Thus, it is an interesting case to illustrate the effect of using a more sound method of
assessing the impact of investment shortfalls on the rise in UAL, as well as the more
complete impact of POB’s and other UAL-drivers.

The Sources of the Rise in UAL: The Conventional Method
The starting point is the decomposition of the annual rise in UAL presented in a plan’s
valuation report. The sources of the rise can be categorized into (i) investment
shortfalls of market return from assumed return; (ii) shortfalls on the liability side due to
changes in and deviations from actuarial assumptions, as well as benefit changes; (iii)
contribution shortfalls relative to interest on the UAL;1 and (iv) other events, such as the
issuance of POB’s (pertinent for CSTRS, as well as other plans).
Let us consider this decomposition formally, with some slightly simplified math:2
(1) UALt ≡ Lt - At
(2) Lt = (Lt - Let|t-1) + Let|t-1 = (Lt - Let|t-1) + (1+r*)Lt-1 + NCt – Bt
(3) At = (1+rt)At-1 + AMTt + NCt – Bt + POBt,
where
At = assets3
Lt = accrued liabilities
Let|t-1 = expected accrued liabilities in period t, as of t-1, under actuarial assumptions
NCt = normal cost
Bt = benefit payments
AMTt = employer contributions in excess of NC, credited toward amortization
r*, rt = assumed and actual return on investment4
POBt = proceeds from pension obligation bonds issued in period t.
Substituting and simplifying, we have the standard actuarial gain/loss result,
decomposing the change in the UAL from t-1 to t:
1

Munnell, et. al., 2015 rightly point out that this is the UAL-relevant contribution shortfall, rather than the
commonly cited shortfall between actual contributions and the ARC, as the ARC may not cover interest.
2 I assume cash flows and annual liability accruals are made at the end of the year, rather than the usual
actuarial assumption of mid-year, thus excluding the associated half-year interest on each.
3 These are market asset values, as are the return on assets, r . The implications of using smoothed
t
asset values, while tangential to the subject of this paper, are briefly discussed below.
4 We take the assumed return r* as constant, which is accurate for CSTRS. For cuts in the assumed
return, the modifications are straight-forward.

4

(4) Δt-1,tUAL = (Lt - Let|t-1) + (r* - rt)At-1 + (r*UALt-1 - AMTt) - POBt.
The first term on the RHS is the loss from liabilities exceeding expectations (i.e. adverse
deviations from liability assumptions, changes in those assumptions, or changes in
benefits); the second term is the loss from investment returns falling short of
expectations; the third term is the loss from amortization payments’ failure to cover
accrued interest on the UAL; and the fourth term is the reduction in UAL from POB’s.5
For the one-year change in UAL, this is an attractive formulation: it unambiguously
allocates the change among liability shortfalls, investment shortfalls, contribution
shortfalls, and POB’s in a way that adds up to the actual change in the UAL.
Specifically, note that there are no interactions among these drivers of the rise in the
UAL that would disrupt additivity; some terms depend on prior values of UAL and A, but
these can be taken as pre-determined. Thus, each source represents a well-defined
counterfactual that is independent of one another: “How would the UAL in period t (and
its rise from period t-1) differ from the actual if in period t investment assumptions had
been met [or liability assumptions had been met, or amortization had covered interest,
or no POB’s had been issued]?” If all four conditions held simultaneously, the rise in
UAL would be zero. Since there are no interactions, the separate counterfactual
impacts sum to the actual rise in the UAL.
How, then, to allocate the rise in UAL over multiple periods, from period 0 to T? The
conventional approach (put forth by Munnell6 and her colleagues at the Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College) is to simply add up each component of (4),
year-by-year, to allocate the total change in the UAL among its various sources:
(5) Δ0,TUAL = Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 + Σt=1T(r*UALt-1 - AMTt) - Σt=1TPOBt
=

Δ0,TUALL:Σ +

Δ0,TUALr:Σ

+

Δ0,TUALC:Σ

+ Δ0,TUALB:Σ.

I label each of the four terms as the contribution to the rise in UAL from each of the four
UAL-drivers, as attributed by the conventional method: Δ0,TUALL:Σ, etc., where Σ
denotes the simple summation from the annual gain/loss statements. We use C in the
third term to denote contribution shortfalls, (r*UALt-1 - AMTt). Using this framework, the
Munnell team estimates that 60.4 percent of the rise in UAL from 2001 to 2013 for the
150 plans in Boston College’s Public Plans Database was due to annual investment
shortfalls, the second term of (5), Δ0,TUALr:Σ.

5

Standard UAL accounting omits the POB debt itself, carried by another party (e.g. the state). I will
provide a full accounting in a later section, below.
6
Munnell, et. al, 2015, “How Did State/Local Plans Become Underfunded?”

5

I will illustrate the conventional method and alternatives to be considered with the case
of the Connecticut State Teachers Retirement System, CSTRS.7 I use an adaptation of
the time series for FY00-FY14. The main difference between this adaptation and the
actual series of CSTRS is the use of market asset values rather than smoothed asset
values – a difference with consequences discussed below. I also exclude the midyear
return for cash flows and accruals from the growth in assets and liabilities, respectively,
a relatively minor difference, to keep the math simple and focused on the issues at
hand.8 The net result of these adaptations is a rise in the UAL of $8.4 billion from FY00
to FY14, rather close to the actual rise of $8.6 billion.
Figure 1 depicts the decomposition of the $8.4 billion rise under the conventional
method. I find that the conventional method would attribute $5.0 billion (about 60
percent) to investment shortfalls (red line) from the assumed return of 8.5 percent.
Contribution shortfalls (purple line) account for another $3.3 billion (around 40 percent).
I have broken out liability losses into those due to deviations from or changes in
assumptions and the FY08 benefit hike for COLA’s.9 These were both offset by the $2
billion POB, also issued in FY08. (The dotted lines will be discussed later.)
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
In Figure 1, note that the cumulative impact of the POB is unchanged after its FY08
impact: the solid orange line is flat at -$2 billion. Similarly, the cumulative impact of the
FY08 benefit enhancement is unchanged thereafter: the brown line is flat. These are
the most visible manifestations of the fact that under the conventional method, the oneyear impact of any contributor to the rise in UAL, as specified in (4), is also the
cumulative impact thereafter, in (5). There is no further impact from the interest on the
initial UAL impact or shortfalls from the assumed return. The implicit assumptions of the
conventional method that underlie this result will be explained below.

Measured Impact of UAL-Drivers Under Smoothed vs. Market Asset Values
In many respects, the use of smoothed vs. market asset values makes little difference
over long periods; the change in asset values and UAL is not much different for CSTRS
over the period in question. However, the attribution of that rise can differ materially
between the investment and contribution shortfalls. In the CSTRS case, I find that
This study uses the series of biennial valuation reports from FY02 – FY14.
One other difference is the exclusion of an actuarial adjustment made in FY08 for the interest on the
integration of funds previously segregated for the COLA.
9 Specifically, the FY08 legislative package (PA 07-186) which authorized the POB’s also changed the
terms of the COLA and converted it from a fund-contingent benefit to a guaranteed one. This resulted in
a $1.151 billion hike to the accrued liability, effectively spending over half the proceeds of the POB’s,
instead of using it all to “pay down” the UAL.
7
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smoothed asset values swings about 7 additional percentage points of the rise in UAL
away from the impact of contribution shortfalls to the impact of investment shortfalls.
The reason is not hard to explain. Over the period in question, smoothed asset values
have, on average, exceeded market asset values for CSTRS, and, consequently, the
smoothed UAL’s have, on average, been lower than the market UAL’s. This means the
assumed interest on the UAL was also lower under smoothing, and, thus, the
contribution shortfall from assumed interest was lower, too. Conversely, since
smoothed asset values were higher, so was the assumed investment income, and,
therefore, the investment shortfall was greater.
The point here is that the allocation of the rise in UAL is sensitive to smoothing. The
difference in average asset values is about 4 percent over this period, but this
corresponds to an average difference in UAL’s of about 7 percent and that results in the
7 point swing in the attribution between investment and contribution shortfalls. Although
the asset-smoothing mechanism may well serve its designated purpose of smoothing
out contributions, it can significantly distort our understanding of the rise in the UAL.
Consequently, I focus on market values in the analysis of this paper.

What is Exogenous Under the Conventional Method?
To understand the underpinnings of the conventional method, one must consider
closely the question of what is exogenous. The unstated premise of the decomposition
of any variable’s growth among the drivers of that growth is that the series of drivers are
to be considered exogenous. That is, if Δ0,TY is to be attributed to the time series of
drivers Xat, Xbt …, t = 1,…,T, then any counterfactual on those drivers must be
considered independent of one another.10 Specifically, the portion of Δ0,TY attributed to
the driver series Xat is answered by the question, “How much different would Δ0,TY have
been, had Xat taken the counterfactual values Xat* that would have contributed nothing
to Δ0,TY, instead of its actual values Xat, holding the other drivers constant at their actual
values?” To pose this “what if” question, one must assume that each series of drivers
can be set independently of the others in the counterfactual, i.e. that each driver can be
considered exogenous.
In the present case, this means that the conventional decomposition of UAL growth
takes as exogenous the series of drivers (Lt - Let|t-1), POBt, (r* - rt)At-1, and Ct ≡ (r*UALt-1
- AMTt). As stated above, the variable Ct denotes the contribution shortfall. The key
assumption implicit in the conventional allocation (5) is that the series of contribution
shortfalls Ct is exogenous. That is what allows one to interpret each term of (5)
pertaining to the other drivers as the answer to the question, “How much different would
10

This is not to say that their impact on Y must be independent of one another, only that the values of the
X’s can be considered independent in the counterfactuals. The question of interactions in their impact on
Y (and, hence, of additivity) is separate.
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Δ0,TUAL have been, had (say) (Lt - Let|t-1) taken the counterfactual values of zero that
would have contributed nothing to Δ0,TUAL (i.e. liability assumptions had been met),
instead of its actual values (Lt - Let|t-1), holding the other drivers constant at their actual
values, including Ct?”
That is, these counterfactuals -- implicit in the conventional method -- take the series of
contribution shortfalls Ct as exogenous at the actual observed levels, independent of the
counterfactual values assigned to the other drivers, and (importantly) their
corresponding impact on UAL. That means in the counterfactuals for the other drivers’
impact, it is implicitly assumed that
(6) AMTt = r*UALt-1 - Ct,
such that Ct is held constant at the actual level and AMTt varies dollar for dollar with the
interest on the UAL, as it reflects the counterfactual impact of the other drivers.
The form of (6) – implicit in the conventional method’s counterfactuals for the other
drivers – is important to understand. Amortization in period t is linear in the interest on
UAL, with coefficient one (i.e. varies dollar-for-dollar) and a constant term equal to the
negative of that year’s actual total dollar contribution shortfall. Figure 2 graphs equation
(6), with the counterfactual values of AMTt on the vertical axis and the counterfactual
values of r*UALt-1 on the horizontal. Equation (6) is parallel to the 45° line (AMTt =
r*UALt-1), shifted down by a constant equal to the actual contribution shortfall, Ct.
[FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
This differs significantly from the typical amortization formula, under which amortization
is proportional to the UAL and its interest. That is, unlike (6), the typical formula has
zero constant and generates contribution shortfalls (surpluses) through a coefficient on
the interest that is less than (greater than) one. Specifically, the formula commonly
employed is “level percent [of payroll].” With assumed growth rate g, the basic form is:11
(7) AMTt = UALt-1(r*-g)/{1 – [(1+g)/(1+r*)]N},
where N is the remaining amortization period (closed or open). We can then write
(8) AMTt = αtr*UALt-1, where αt = [(r*-g)/r*]/{1 – [(1+g)/(1+r*)]N}.

11

As before, we simplify by ignoring the actuarial conventions regarding mid-year cash flows. Another
departure from typical actuarial practice is that AMT will often be based on 2 (or more) years lagged UAL,
due to timing of actuarial reports.
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As stated above, this differs from (6) by virtue of a zero constant and a coefficient on
interest αt that can be less than (greater than) one.12 For example, with r* = 0.085 and g
= 0.0375, αt < 1 for N ≥ 19. That is how contribution shortfalls are typically generated.
Figure 2 graphs equation (8). It is a clockwise rotation of equation (6), through their
common point, which is the actual value of (r*UALt-1, AMTt).
Munnell’s team finds that contribution shortfalls are more common than not,13 but the
mechanism by which those shortfalls are generated is misrepresented by (6), as
embedded in the conventional method. Both (6) and (8) model the same total shortfall,
(r*UALt-1 - AMTt), and the same average shortfall, (r*UALt-1 - AMTt)/r*UALt-1 for the
actual values AMTt and r*UALt-1. However, they differ importantly in the marginal
shortfall for the counterfactual values, Δ(r*UALt-1 - AMTt)/Δ(r*UALt-1) – one minus the
slope of the counterfactual line. Under (6) it is zero, and under (8) it is (1 - αt). This is
the crux of the problem with the conventional method – the main source of its
misleading assessments of driver impacts -- as I will explain.
In some cases, budgeters do not actually fund the amortization formula in place, but
instead contribute “what they can afford.” This is an elusive concept, to be sure,
governed by tax revenues and non-pension expenditures that are considered nondiscretionary. But it seems clear that in such cases the amortization payments are even
less responsive to the UAL than the amortization formula. In effect, AMT t is exogenous,
corresponding to the horizontal line in Figure 2.

What are the implications of Taking Ct as Exogenous?
Before completing my formal analysis, I can sketch the implications of the conventional
method’s treatment of Ct as exogenous, i.e. modeling AMTt by (6) instead of (8).
Consider the measured impact of investment shortfalls, liability shortfalls and POB’s.14
The main issue here is investment shortfalls. In short, if αt < 1, the conventional method
will underestimate the impact of investment shortfalls (and, conversely, if α t > 1, it will
overestimate the impact). The reason is that under the conventional method, if an
The coefficient αt can vary over time as plans change assumptions on g or N changes (either a policy
change for the open interval, or, automatically, with the passage of years for a closed interval). Note that
αt cannot be less than one with g = 0, i.e. “level dollar” amortization. Conversely, with open interval
amortization, αt can be less than one indefinitely with sufficiently high values of g and N, and that has
been the case for some plans with 30-year rolling horizons, as Munnell, et. al. point out.
13
They calculate that contribution shortfalls account for 23.7 percent of the rise in UAL’s from 2001 to
2013 for the 150 plans in Boston College’s Public Plans Database.
14 The measured impact of the series of contribution shortfalls itself is independent of the counterfactual
modeling of AMTt using (6) or (8) or any other variant. That impact is measured by the difference
between the actual Δ0,TUAL, where all drivers take their actual values, and the counterfactual Δ0,TUAL
where Ct* = 0, i.e. AMTt = r*UALt-1, or, equivalently, αt* = 1. This difference does not involve (6) or (8).
12
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investment shortfall occurs, generating an increment to the UAL and to the interest on
the UAL the following year, the amortization is implicitly assumed to cover the
incremental interest dollar-for-dollar, adding nothing to the contribution shortfall. If,
instead, the true amortization process only partially covers additional interest (αt < 1),
then there will be an additional contribution shortfall, induced by the investment shortfall.
This can be understood in terms of equation (5). Under the conventional method,
investment shortfalls generate UAL impacts directly through the second term of (5),
Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1, with no indirect impact through the third term, Σt=1T(r*UALt-1 - AMTt),
which remains unchanged by implicit assumption (6). But if amortization is actually
governed by (8) with αt < 1, then the marginal contribution shortfall is (1 - αt) > 0, so
there will be an additional contribution shortfall induced by the investment shortfall,
reflected in the third term of (5). In short, there is a significant interaction between
investment shortfalls and an amortization regime that generates contribution shortfalls.
This disrupts additivity, but that is the way amortization formulas work. To implicitly
assume away the interactions by virtue of (6) yields an appealing additivity, but at the
price of underestimating the impact of investment shortfalls in a regime of underfunding.
The conventional method’s treatment of Ct as exogenous also explains the puzzling
time pattern of other drivers’ impact. Consider the FY08 COLA enhancement that
raised the UAL that year by $1.15 billion. As Figure 1 shows (brown line), under the
conventional method, the cumulative impact remains unchanged thereafter. There is
no further measured impact from the potential accumulation of interest on the additional
UAL because the implicit assumption is that additional amortization covers that interest.
If, instead, the amortization regime does not fully cover additional interest (α t < 1), then
there would be additional contribution shortfalls, induced by the benefit enhancement.
Again, the potential interaction between the benefit enhancement and an amortization
regime that underfunds on the margin is assumed away. The same is true for any given
year’s deviation from liability assumptions.
This logic also explains the one-shot time pattern of POB’s impact. As Figure 1
illustrates, under the conventional method, the reduction in UAL from the POB proceeds
is recorded in the year of issue ($2 billion in FY08 for CSTRS) and remains unchanged
in the cumulative accounting going forward. One might think that the subsequent
earnings on the proceeds of the POB contribute to the further diminution of the UAL
attributable to the POB. Indeed, that definitely seems implicit in the arguments heard
for POB’s, namely the arbitrage gains from the returns r* that are assumed to be earned
on the proceeds. Again, the explanation of those returns’ omission from the subsequent
impact of the POB lies in the conventional method’s assumption for amortization. As
the POB reduces the UAL (by, say $2 billion), the interest on the UAL is also reduced
and, under the conventional method, amortization payments are reduced dollar-fordollar. This cancels out the assumed return on the proceeds of the POB.
10

There is, however, another aspect to the POB impact that is also missed by the
conventional method, due to another problem, unrelated to amortization. That is the
inconsistent treatment of asset values in the second term of (5) (investment shortfalls)
for the counterfactuals, including the one for POB’s. Before continuing the formal
analysis of the treatment of amortization, I need to fix this problem, so that the
counterfactuals are internally consistent with respect to asset values.
Consistent Counterfactuals with Exogenous Contribution Shortfalls
To construct consistent counterfactuals, we want to examine the impact of each of the
UAL-drivers while simultaneously satisfying system (1) – (3), which implies (4) and (5).
The counterfactuals answer the question: “What is the impact of each UAL-driver,
assuming the other drivers are unchanged?”
Specifically, we start with each of the four series of UAL-drivers – (Lt - Let|t-1), (r* - rt), Ct
≡ (r*UALt-1 - AMTt), and POBt, t = 1,…T – set to their actual values, so the baseline
UALT is the actual (as is its rise from UAL0). We then take each driver one at a time,
setting it to a series of zeros, and compare the resulting counterfactual UAL T to the
actual (or, equivalently, compare its rise from UAL0) to find that driver’s impact.15
In doing so, there is a further flaw implicit in the conventional method, and that involves
the term (r* - rt)At-1 in (5). Although this series – the dollar value of the annual
investment shortfall – is implicitly treated as exogenous in (5), the intent behind this
component is clearly to assess the impact of the shortfall in the investment return, (r* rt). That is, the “what if” counterfactuals for the non-investment shortfalls compare the
UAL if one of those series of drivers equals zero, which means the lagged asset series
At-1 cannot be taken as exogenous -- as implied by the term Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 in (5). That
is, in setting (say) the (Lt - Let|t-1) series at zero and comparing the resulting value of (5)
with the actual value of (5), one cannot legitimately hold the second term constant.
Instead, the counterfactual values of At-1 must be modelled as in (3), using the
counterfactual values of AMTt. Here I maintain the conventional method’s implicit
assumption of exogenous contribution shortfalls, Ct ≡ (r*UALt-1 - AMTt), which implies
the amortization regime (6). That is, internal consistency is satisfied by modeling the

15

An alternative set of consistent counterfactuals (call them zero-base) would start with each of the four
series of UAL-drivers set to a vector of zeros, so there is no rise in UAL, as shown in (5). We would then
take each driver one at a time, setting it to the actual series to find the impact on UAL. These
counterfactuals answer the question: “What is the impact of each UAL-driver at its actual value,
assuming the other drivers are zero?” Arguably, the version in the text is the “what if” that policy people
have in mind. One might also argue that these comprise a more compelling set of counterfactuals than
the zero-base ones, since the zero baseline is so far removed from the actual. The implications of the
zero-base counterfactuals are explained in a note below.
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counterfactual values of At using (3) and (6), and of course the counterfactual series
UALt that is implied by the assumed values of the drivers.16
So how do the UAL-impacts under these consistent counterfactuals compare with the
uncorrected conventional method? The answer is that the impact of the investment
shortfall equals that of the uncorrected method, but the others do not.
The result can be seen by examining the counterfactuals with (5). For the investment
shortfall, denoting the counterfactual by superscript r:C (for exogenous C), we have:
(5r:C) Δ0,TUALr:C = [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt]
- [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - r*)Ar:Ct-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt] = Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 = Δ0,TUALr:Σ
The first bracketed term is the actual rise in UAL, using actual values of the drivers, and
the second bracketed term is the counterfactual rise in UAL, using actual values for all
drivers except rt = r*. The difference is Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1, with actual values of At-1, as in
the conventional allocation. The endogeneity of the series Ar:Ct-1 under this
counterfactual is irrelevant, since it is multiplied by zero. Thus, Δ0,TUALr:C = Δ0,TUALr:Σ.
The endogeneity of At-1, however, does matter for the other drivers, notably the POB:
(5B:C) Δ0,TUALB:C = [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt]
- [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)AB:Ct-1 + Σt=1TCt] ≠ - Σt=1TPOBt = Δ0,TUALB:Σ,
because the series AB:Ct-1 ≠ At-1. Specifically, in the year of the POB, if it had not been
issued, the counterfactual value of AB:Ct would be reduced by the full POB amount.
Therefore, in period t+1 the POB’s absence would have reduced any investment
shortfalls from (r* - rt+1). That is, to state the result directly, the POB’s favorable UAL
impact in period t is partially offset in t+1 by the investment shortfalls on the proceeds.
CSTRS provides a dramatic example. Immediately following the POB issue of $2
billion, the fund lost 17.84 percent in FY09, 26.34 percentage points below the assumed
return. Thus, the investment shortfall on the $2 billion was $527 million that year,
offsetting a good portion of the prior year’s UAL reduction from the POB proceeds. This
can be seen directly on Figure 1, comparing the FY09 point on the dotted orange curve
(representing Δ0,TUALB:C) with the point on the solid orange curve for Δ0,TUALB:Σ, which

I hold (NC – B)t to their actual values for all of the counterfactuals. This would not be a strictly valid
assumption for counterfactuals where the benefit structure differs from the actual, but in cases where
benefit changes are minor – as in CSTRS over the period in question – this assumption should not be
terribly problematic. Note also that I am assuming the difference (NC – B)t is fixed at its actual value, a
slightly weaker assumption than holding NCt and Bt fixed separately.
16
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lies along the -$2 billion line. The result is intuitive, but the point here is that it is not
reflected in the conventional method.17
Similarly (albeit less dramatically), for the liability shortfalls, we have
(5L:C) Δ0,TUALL:C = [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt]
- [Σt=1T(r* - rt)AL:Ct-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt] ≠ Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) = Δ0,TUALL:Σ,
because, again, the series AL:Ct-1 differs from At-1, due to the endogenous amortization.
Specifically, in the year following any liability shortfall, if that shortfall had not occurred
the counterfactual assumes that AMT would be reduced by the interest on the UAL that
would have been occasioned by that shortfall. This would reduce AL:Ct+1 and, therefore,
in period t+2 it would reduce any investment losses from (r* - rt+2). The difference,
however, is nearly imperceptible in Figure 1, between the solid and dotted liability
curves. Similarly, there is a slight difference between the impact of contribution
shortfalls under the consistent counterfactual and the conventional allocation, as
indicated by the dotted purple line in Figure 1.
I consider the dotted lines (where they differ from the solid ones) to be the correct
impact of the UAL drivers, under the maintained assumption that Ct is exogenous. It is
worth noting that the property of additivity is violated here. That property depended on
each term in (5) equaling the difference between the actual Δ0,TUAL and the
counterfactual value when one of the drivers was set to zero. This no longer holds
when At’s endogeneity is recognized. The non-additivity may be empirically small
under exogenous Ct (the dotted lines in Figure 1 sum to 101.3 percent of the total rise in
UAL). But additivity does require inconsistent counterfactuals and will be more
significantly violated when the assumption of exogenous C is replaced.
The construction of consistent counterfactuals and their comparison with the
conventional method18 has been, perhaps, tedious, given the lack of dramatic
17

Note, however, that if r = r* the cumulative UAL impact of the POB is again unchanged beyond the
initial impact. The result in (5B:C) pertains to investment shortfalls, not the interest on the POB proceeds.
Under the assumption of exogenous Ct, that interest is still assumed to be offset by reduced amortization.
This comment applies also to the interest on liability shortfalls.
18
For the zero-base counterfactuals, introduced in a previous note, the results are the mirror image of the
counterfactuals presented in the text: the impact of investment shortfalls differs from the conventional
allocation, but the other impacts are the same. Consider, for example, the liability shortfalls. Under the
zero-base method (where the baseline Δ0,TUAL = 0), we examine the counterfactual value of (5) where
the liability shortfalls, (Lt - Let|t-1), hold their actual values while 0 = (r* - rt) = Ct = POBt, t = 1,…T. Denoting
the result with the superscript L:z (for zero-base liability counterfactual), we have:
Δ0,TUALL:z = Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) = Δ0,TUALL:Σ, since the other three terms of (5) are set to zero by construction.
That is, the conventional allocation of the rise in UAL to liability shortfalls corresponds to the zero-base
counterfactual. The endogeneity of At does not affect this result. That is because its value in the second
term of (5) is irrelevant to both the baseline and the liability counterfactual, with 0 = (r* - rt) in both. The
same result holds for POB’s and the contribution shortfalls. For the investment shortfalls, however, the
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differences, except for the investment shortfalls on the POB. However, it is important to
get the counterfactual right, not only for its own sake, but also to determine that the
inconsistent treatment of asset values is not the main problem. That is the exogeneity
of Ct and the treatment of amortization. In the remainder of this paper, analyzing this
problem, I adopt the consistent counterfactuals, i.e. At as treated as endogenous.

Exogenous AMTt Contrasted with Exogenous Contribution Shortfall, Ct
I return to my main theme, the counterfactual treatment of amortization. As we have
seen, in analyzing the conventional UAL allocation, (5), the implicit assumption is that
AMTt varies dollar for dollar with r*UALt-1 under the various counterfactuals that
generate endogenous UAL’s (i.e. the target of the exercise). That is, the implied
counterfactuals are of the form, “What would be the impact on UAL if (say) investments
had met the assumed return, and amortization payments had correspondingly adjusted
dollar-for-dollar to the interest on the resulting UAL’s?” As I have argued, this will
underestimate the impact of investment shortfalls for typical amortization formulas with
αt < 1. To get a deeper, more formal understanding of why this is so, in this section, I
will consider the case of exogenous AMTt. To put it in context of (6) and (8), this is the
extreme case where the counterfactual AMTt does not vary at all with the interest on
counterfactual changes in UAL. In terms of Figure 2, we are simply rotating the line all
the way around the actual values of AMTt and r*UALt-1, from (6) to (8) to the actual AMTt
line itself, where the slope is zero and the marginal shortfall is one. I examine this
extreme case in detail because it generates clear analytical results that will serve to
clarify the intermediate case (8), illustrated in the next section. As mentioned above, it
may also be relevant to the case where budgeters do not fund the amortization formula,
but simply contribute “what they can afford.”
Specifically, there are two points that will emerge from this analysis. First, under this
formulation interest is reflected in the UAL impact of the drivers such as (Lt - Let|t-1) and
POBt, unlike the conventional allocation. That is, the interest ensuing from the initial
UAL impact accrues for additional UAL impact instead of going to amortization
payments. This is a direct consequence of assuming counterfactual AMTt does not vary
at all, let alone dollar-for-dollar with interest on the UAL.
Second, there are significant interactions among the UAL-drivers for the impact on the
UAL. That is, if we add up the individual counterfactual UAL impacts, the total may far
result differs from the conventional allocation: Δ0,TUALr:z = Σt=1T(r* - rt)Ar:zt-1 ≠ Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 = Δ0,TUALr:Σ,
since the endogenous series Ar:zt-1 (generated by (3) with AMTr:z instead of actual AMT) will not equal the
actual series At-1. In principle, that can matter, when rt ≠ r*. In practice, this may not matter much. In our
adapted CSTRS example, with exogenous Ct, the UAL impact of investment shortfalls is 58.4 percent of
the total rise under the zero-base counterfactuals, instead of 59.7 percent in the conventional allocation.
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exceed the actual rise in UAL. Thus, if our goal is to allocate the rise in UAL among its
drivers, we may face a large adding-up problem. On the other hand, if the policy
interest is the impact of each driver taken one at a time, these are the estimates that we
want. This issue will persist (in attenuated form) under our preferred alternative (8), as
discussed in the next section, so this section explains the problem in its purest form.
I will derive the reduced form expression for Δ0,TUAL. Specifically, I will solve for the
series At and UALt to express Δ0,TUAL solely in terms of the series: (Lt - Let|t-1), rt, AMTt,
NCt, Bt, and POBt, given the initial conditions A0 and UAL0. To do so, the system (3) –
(4) is usefully expressed in matrix form:
(

𝐴
𝐴
) = 𝑴𝑡 (
)
+ 𝒗𝑡 ,
𝑈𝐴𝐿 𝑡
𝑈𝐴𝐿 𝑡−1

where 𝑴𝑡 = [

(1 + 𝑟𝑡 )
(𝑟 ∗ − 𝑟𝑡 )

This implies (

0
𝐴𝑀𝑇 + (𝑁𝐶 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝑂𝐵
].
∗ ] and 𝑣𝑡 = [
(1 + 𝑟 )
(𝐿 − 𝐿𝑒 ) − 𝐴𝑀𝑇 − 𝑃𝑂𝐵 𝑡

𝐴
𝐴
) = 𝑴𝑇 𝑴𝑇−1 … 𝑴1 (
) + 𝑴𝑇 𝑴𝑇−1 … 𝑴2 𝑣1 + ⋯ + 𝑴𝑇 𝑣𝑇−1 + 𝑣𝑇 .
𝑈𝐴𝐿 𝑇
𝑈𝐴𝐿 0

It can be shown, by induction, that
∏
𝑴𝑇 𝑴𝑇−1 … 𝑴1 =
[

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝑡 )

𝑡=1

[(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇 − ∏

𝑇

0
(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝑡 )]

𝑡=1

]

and similarly for MTMT-1…Mt. Thus, we have
∏

𝐴
(
) =
𝑈𝐴𝐿 𝑇

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝑡 )

𝑡=1

[(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇 − ∏

[

+ ∑
(

𝑇

0

(1 + 𝑟𝑡 )] (1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇

𝑡=1

𝑇

𝑇−1

∏

𝑡=1

∗ 𝑇−𝑡

[

𝐴
)
𝑈𝐴𝐿 0

(

[(1 + 𝑟 )

(1 + 𝑟𝜏 )

𝜏=𝑡+1

−∏

Finally, from this expression we have:
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𝑇

]
0
∗ 𝑇−𝑡

(1 + 𝑟𝜏 )] (1 + 𝑟 )

𝜏=𝑡+1

𝑣𝑡
]

+ 𝑣𝑇 .
)

(9) ∆0,𝑇 𝑈𝐴𝐿 = [(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇 − ∏
+∑
+∑

𝑇−1
𝑡=1
𝑇

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝑡 )] 𝐴0 + [(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇 − 1]𝑈𝐴𝐿0

𝑡=1

[(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇−𝑡 − ∏

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝜏 )] [𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑡 + (𝑁𝐶 − 𝐵)𝑡 + 𝑃𝑂𝐵𝑡 ]

𝜏=𝑡+1

(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇−𝑡 [(𝐿𝑡 − 𝐿𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 ) − 𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑡 − 𝑃𝑂𝐵𝑡 ].

𝑡=1

For the actual values of all the variables (as denoted by the absence of superscripts),
the sum in (9) is equal to the sum in (5), but the counterfactuals (other than the one for
contribution shortfall) will differ, because here AMTt will be taken as exogenous instead
of Ct ≡ (r*UALt-1 - AMTt).
One can readily find the counterfactual impact from (9) for liability shortfalls and POB’s.
For liability shortfalls, (Lt - Let|t-1), simply take the difference between the actual Δ0,TUAL
given in (9) and the value it would take with (Lt - Let|t-1) = 0. Since everything else in (9)
is unchanged (exogenous or pre-determined), the result is straightforward:
∆0,𝑇 𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐿:𝐴𝑀𝑇 = ∑

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇−𝑡 (𝐿𝑡 − 𝐿𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 ),

𝑡=1

where the superscript AMT denotes its exogeneity in the counterfactual. Here, the UAL
impact of liability shortfalls includes the cumulative interest (at assumed rate r*), unlike
the conventional framework where no interest is attributed to liability shortfalls,
Δ0,TUALL:Σ = Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1). That is because in the conventional framework, with
exogenous Ct, AMTt responds to cover the interest on liability shortfalls. Conversely,
with AMTt exogenous, the liability shortfalls have no impact on amortization. In effect,
the assumption of exogenous AMTt reallocates the interest on the UAL impact from
amortization (under exogenous Ct), to the UAL instead.
The difference can be seen in Figure 3, which depicts the impact on UAL of selected
drivers,19 under exogenous Ct, exogenous AMTt, and (for reference in the next section)
exogenous αt. For all cases, I depict the impact under consistent counterfactuals
(endogenous asset values). The UAL impact of the CSTRS benefit change in FY08
(brown curves) illustrates the difference between exogenous Ct and exogenous AMTt.
The dotted line, reproduced from Figure 1, shows the cumulative impact after FY08 was
essentially unchanged20 from the initial impact, under exogenous Ct because

19

Not shown, to maintain legibility in the figure, are the UAL impact of deviations from liability
assumptions and of the contribution shortfall. However, the latter is the same under exogenous AMTt
and exogenous Ct (as well as exogenous αt, discussed below) since, in all cases, we are comparing the
actual UAL with the UAL under the assumption that AMT t = r*UALt-1.
20 It is exactly unchanged under the conventional method, but is slightly changed under consistent
counterfactuals, where asset values are treated endogenously, as discussed above.
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amortization is assumed to cover the additional interest. As the dashed curve shows,
under exogenous AMTt, the impact grows with accrued interest at the assumed rate r*.
[FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that the reduction in the UAL due to the POB will
include the investment return, at the actual rate, rt:
∆0,𝑇 𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐵:𝐴𝑀𝑇 = − ∑

𝑇−1
𝑡=1

[∏

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝜏 )] 𝑃𝑂𝐵𝑡 − 𝑃𝑂𝐵𝑇 .

𝜏=𝑡+1

As we saw in Figure 1, under the conventional method, the initial impact persisted
unchanged. Under consistent counterfactuals with exogenous Ct, the overall impact
shrunk after FY08, reflecting the investment shortfalls, relative to r*, on the POB
proceeds. This is shown in the dotted orange curve of Figure 3, reproduced from Figure
1. Under exogenous AMTt, depicted in the dashed orange curve of Figure 3, we can
again see the strongly negative return in FY09 shrinking the initial impact. Overall,
however, the impact (i.e. reduction in UAL) grows over the period, as the actual return, r t
has been generally positive, albeit less than r*. The difference is that under the
conventional frameworks’ exogenous Ct, AMTt is reduced to offset the assumed interest
on the reduced UAL; with exogenous AMTt, the POB occasions no such reduction in
contributions, so the reduction in UAL is greater.
I turn now to our main focus, the impact of investment shortfalls. The counterfactual
value of Δ0,TUAL, is found by setting rt = r* in (9). This zeros out the first and third terms
and leaves the other terms unchanged, under exogenous AMTt. Thus, the difference
between the actual Δ0,TUAL and its counterfactual value is the first and third terms:
∆0,𝑇 𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑟:𝐴𝑀𝑇 = [(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇 − ∏
+∑

𝑇−1
𝑡=1

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝑡 )] 𝐴0

𝑡=1

[(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇−𝑡 − ∏

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝜏 )] [𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑡 + (𝑁𝐶 − 𝐵)𝑡 + 𝑃𝑂𝐵𝑡 ]

𝜏=𝑡+1

This UAL impact is simply the compounded difference between (1 + r*) and (1 + rt) over
the T-year period, as applied to the initial assets and the annual cash flows (all of which
are held exogenous at the actual levels).21
The UAL impact under exogenous AMTt is depicted for the CSTRS example by the
dashed red line in Figure 3. It is dramatically higher than the conventional estimate,

21

There is an additional term for the cash flows for period T. This is not affected by rT, so it is the same
under the actual and the counterfactual, and does not enter the impact of the investment shortfalls.
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under exogenous Ct, depicted by the dotted red line (reproduced from Figure 1): $12.0
billion vs. $5.0 billion.
Equation (9) can be used to illuminate the difference between the UAL impact of the
investment shortfall under exogenous Ct and AMTt. The difference is in the
counterfactual value of AMTt in the last term of (9). Under exogenous Ct, the
counterfactual value of AMTt is given in (6), specifically here, AMTr:Ct = r*UALr:Ct-1 - Ct.
Thus, Δ0,TUALr:C can be written as the difference between the actual value of (9) and the
counterfactual value of (9) with rt = r* and AMTr:Ct.22 Specifically, Δ0,TUALr:C has the
same two terms as Δ0,TUALr:AMT, but also has a third term:
(10) ∆0,𝑇 𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑟:𝐶
= [(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇 − ∏
+∑
+∑

𝑇−1
𝑡=1
𝑇

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝑡 )] 𝐴0

𝑡=1

[(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇−𝑡 − ∏

𝑇

(1 + 𝑟𝜏 )] [𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑡 + (𝑁𝐶 − 𝐵)𝑡 + 𝑃𝑂𝐵𝑡 ]

𝜏=𝑡+1

(1 + 𝑟 ∗ )𝑇−𝑡 [𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑡𝑟:𝐶 − 𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑡 ]

𝑡=1

The third term is negative, since the counterfactual values of AMTt are reduced under
(6) (exogenous Ct) when rt = r* reduces the UAL’s. Thus, Δ0,TUALr:AMT (exogenous
AMTt) exceeds Δ0,TUALr:C (exogenous Ct) by Σt=1T (1+r*)T-t(AMTt - AMTr:Ct) =
Σt=1T (1+r*)T-t r*(UALt-1 - UALr:Ct-1). This represents the cumulative value (with interest, as
of period T) of the amortization payments that are assumed, under exogenous C t, to
cover the additional interest on UAL from the failure of investment to meet the assumed
returns, r*. Under exogenous AMTt these additional payments would not have been
made, so the full impact of the investment shortfalls would fall on UAL, instead of being
offset, as under the conventional method.
As Figure 3 suggests, adding up the UAL impacts of each driver under exogenous AMTt
well exceeds the conventional estimates and, hence, the actual rise in UAL – about
double in the case of CSTRS. Why is there this big adding-up discrepancy? The
answer is (by definition) that there are large interaction effects. Concretely, the
important interactions here are between the impact of the investment shortfalls and a
regime of underfunding. If investment shortfalls raise UAL, but the funding formula does
not adjust amortization for the ensuing additional interest (or does not fully adjust, as in
(8)), then there is a further rise in UAL from the subsequent underfunding. Thus, if we
add up the UAL impacts one at a time (especially investment shortfalls and contribution
shortfalls) we will find a total that is much larger than taking them all together.

The result is equivalent to that given in (5r:C) [Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1] but the derivation from (9) is more readily
compared with Δ0,TUALr:AMT.
22
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So what are we to make of the adding-up problem? In my view, the answer is “not too
much.” The end-goal of a policy-relevant exercise is to evaluate useful counterfactuals,
not necessarily to parcel out the total rise in UAL in a fashion that adds up. Indeed, if
we get a solution that adds up for uninteresting counterfactuals – especially ones that
are misunderstood -- we may in fact be misinforming the user. If the user’s interest is
the impact of (say) a high assumed rate of return, we should use the right counterfactual
to answer that simple question. If the user’s interest is the impact of multiple drivers
taken together, then one should simply use that joint counterfactual, which will properly
handle the interactions.
To repeat, none of this discussion is meant to argue in favor of treating AMTt as
exogenous in our counterfactual analyses, except in cases where funders simply
contribute “what they can afford,” instead of funding the formula. However, the same
issues arise when AMTt is governed by the formula, albeit in attenuated form. I have
examined the exogenous AMTt case in such detail because it illuminates the issues
most clearly.
Exogenous Amortization Factor, αt
Instead of assuming that Ct or AMTt is exogenous, it is more natural to assume that the
actual amortization formula in use is exogenous.23 As discussed above, amortization
formulas typically result in payments that are proportional to the interest on the UAL,
with a factor αt, as given in (8). If so, then taking the formula as exogenous is
equivalent to taking αt as exogenous. Thus, if one is willing to assume that the formula
is of the proportional form, one need not delve deeply into the formula’s intricacies, but
simply take the actual αt ≡ AMTt/r*UALt-1 as our exogenous series.
The “what if” exercises for investment and liability shortfalls and POB take αt as
exogenous at the actual level and model the counterfactual AMT t using (8). In this way,
the estimated impact of the UAL-driver under consideration factors in a proportional
AMT response to changes in the UAL interest, rather than a dollar-for-dollar response or
zero response.24 As shown in Figure 2, if αt < 1 (underfunding), the counterfactual AMT
formula lies between the other two counterfactuals examined, exogenous Ct and AMTt.
Thus, it is not surprising that the results of this method lie between the two other
methods. Specifically, the solid lines in Figure 3 take as exogenous the series of αt’s
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That said, it is not unheard of for plans to change their amortization formula in response to adverse
developments, such as investment shortfalls.
24
The “what if” exercise for contribution shortfalls compares the actual UAL under the actual series α t with
the no-shortfall series, α* = 1 (analogous to comparing the series r t and r* for investment shortfalls). As
stated earlier, it is no different than for exogenous AMT t or Ct.
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derived from our adapted version of CSTRS. Taken at face value (though see the
caveats in the note below), αt has averaged about 0.6 over the period FY01-FY14.25
These results – the solid lines in Figure 3 – represent my preferred method for
estimating the UAL impact of each driver, taken one at a time. Most notably, the impact
of investment shortfalls (with the superscript notation r:α, to denote exogenous αt) is
$7.3 billion instead of $5.0 billion under the conventional method. Again, this result is
due to replacing the implicit counterfactual assumption that AMTt varies dollar-for-dollar
with the interest on the resulting impact on UAL. The more realistic assumption, that
AMTt varies at the actual historical proportion αt, provides a much more credible and
useful estimate for policy-makers of the UAL impact of investment shortfalls.
Adding up the impacts of all UAL-drivers exceeds the actual rise in UAL, due to the
interactions discussed earlier. As previously argued, the adding-up goal is not of direct
policy relevance. If the goal is to assess the impact of all drivers taken together, then
that can be directly modeled: the result will reflect the interactions and will,
tautologically, equal the actual rise in UAL. The conventional methodology, in effect
assumes away the interactions by virtue of an untenable implicit assumption regarding
amortization.26 The individual impacts add up, but they are not of policy relevance.

The Impact of Shortfalls on Cumulative Contributions and UAL
Another impact of interest from the UAL-drivers is their impact on cumulative
contributions. That is, we are not only interested in the impact of these drivers on
payments-yet-to-be made – the UAL – but also the impact on payments that have been
made – the amortization. This is an important impact and one that differs under
exogenous Ct, AMTt, and αt. I will compare here the impact on cumulative amortization
and UAL of investment shortfalls and other drivers under the different assumptions.
25

My adaptation differs from the actual CSTRS calculations in manners that can be substantive. The
differences include the 2-3 year lag between amortization and UAL (due to CSTRS’ biennial valuation
schedule) and smoothed vs. market valuation. Moreover, the reason αt < 1 for CSTRS is different from
the discussion of (7)-(8). Unlike most plans, CSTRS divides up its UAL into separate pieces and
amortizes them separately. For the main piece, the remaining amortization period (closed) is now short
enough to make αt > 1, but there is also a significant piece of negative amortization, which is amortized
over a shorter period, and that renders the overall ratio of amortization to interest less than one. Thus,
the appropriation here of the overall αt’s “as if” the formula was proportional is solely for illustrative
purposes. Note also that when the period of negative amortization ends (in FY22), net amortization
payments will jump and, barring any change in the formula, the overall αt will exceed 1. The same feature
characterized the Public School Employees’ Retirement System of Pennsylvania, and when the period of
negative amortization ended, there was a huge (and predicted) spike in amortization payments that has
caused great difficulty (see Costrell and Maloney, 2013, especially Figure B-2).
26 It would be equally misleading to “fix” the α-based impacts to force them to add up. The usual such
“fixes” are: (i) scaling down all figures; and (ii) adding drivers one at a time, in an arbitrary order, instead
of examining their impacts singly. These are solutions to a problem of appearances, more than policy.
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The result is that the total impact is virtually invariant, but the split between paid and
unpaid impact varies by assumption.
As we have seen, the counterfactuals embed within them the assumed behavior of
AMTt, depending on what is assumed to be exogenous: Ct, αt, or AMTt itself, as
illustrated in Figure 2. Thus, for the counterfactual on investment shortfalls (i.e. where r
= r* and all other drivers are at their actual values), we have, under the conventional
method (exogenous Ct) from (6):
(6r:C)

AMTr:Ct = r*UALr:Ct-1 - Ct.

This generates a series of impacts of the investment shortfalls on amortization
payments, the difference between the actual and the counterfactual, AMT t - AMTr:Ct =
r*(UALt-1 - UALr:Ct-1). To put these amortization impacts on a common footing with the
UAL impacts, period by period, one calculates their cumulative value, with the assumed
interest r*. That is, one calculates the asset value of the series of amortization impacts,
with the following result by year T:
Σt=1T(1+r*)T-t(AMTt - AMTr:Ct) = Σt=1T (1+r*)T-tr*(UALt-1 - UALr:Ct-1).
This term appeared (in its negative value) in (10) above, and represented the difference
between the UAL impact of investment shortfalls under exogenous C t and exogenous
AMTt. It is represented in Figure 4 as the $7.0 billion blue bar in the first column. The
total impact of investment shortfalls – UAL plus cumulative amortization – is $12.0
billion, the same under exogenous Ct and exogenous AMTt (the third column in Figure
4). Since (by definition), there is no amortization impact under exogenous AMTt, the
$7.0 billion blue bar in the first column is the difference between the UAL impacts under
exogenous Ct and AMTt, as stated above.
[FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
For my preferred model, exogenous αt, the $12.0 billion total impact is split between
$7.3 billion impact on UAL (previously depicted in Figure 3) and the $4.7 billion impact
on cumulative amortization, represented by the blue bar in the 2 nd column of Figure 4.
In short, the conventional method -- with exogenous Ct – implicitly attributes a
substantial portion ($2.3 billion in this example) of the total impact of investment
shortfalls to amortization instead of UAL. That is, the conventional method implicitly
assumes that much more of the impact has already been paid for than the amortization
formula would imply, so the UAL impact is that much smaller. More precisely, the
counterfactual scenario is that without the investment shortfalls, the amortization
payments would have been $7.0 billion lower, instead of the $4.7 billion implied by the
amortization formula, so the UAL would have been only $5.0 billion lower, instead of
$7.3 billion lower.
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Similar observations apply to the impacts on the UAL and cumulative amortization of
benefit hikes and liability shortfalls. Thus, the 2nd and 3rd triplets in Figure 4 are similar
to the 1st triplet, but on reduced scale. The same pattern holds for POB’s, but of the
reverse sign, as shown in the 5th triplet.
For contribution shortfalls – depicted in the 4th triplet -- the counterfactual amortization
assumptions do not matter. They pertain only to the other counterfactual impacts. The
UAL impact of the contribution shortfall is offset by the reduction in amortization – by
definition – so the total impact is essentially zero.
One might be tempted to dismiss the impact of investment shortfalls and other UALdrivers on cumulative amortization as a matter of little significance since, after all, this
has already been paid. But this impact is not totally benign. It means that some of the
costs have been shifted from the cohort that incurred them to a later cohort, creating
some generational inequity in doing so. In other words, the split of the impact between
paid (cumulative amortization) and yet-to-be-paid (UAL) is really a split between
generational inequity already imposed and generational inequity to come.
To summarize, the conventional method understates the impact of investment shortfalls
in two ways. Using the CSTRS example, the impact on UAL is understated at $5.0
billion instead of $7.3 billion. In addition, the conventional method ignores the $4.7
billion impact on cumulative amortization, and the attendant inequity that has already
been visited upon recent cohorts by the shortfall of investment returns from the
assumed return.

Accounting for Pension Obligation Bonds
To complete the picture for CSTRS and other plans that have relied on POB’s, one
should include the POB debt itself. Although POB’s are typically issued by the state,
rather than the pension plan, for the taxpayer both the UAL and POB debt are liabilities.
Indeed, the full liability is understood in pitching POB’s, since they are sold as an
arbitrage play, borrowing at one rate and investing in the plan, with assumed return r*.
In the case of CSTRS, the State Treasurer estimated the interest at 5.88 percent over
the 25-year life of the bonds, compared to 8.5 percent assumed return on the proceeds,
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invested in CSTRS.27 Since the bonds were issued in FY0828, I estimate that the return
on CSTRS was 6.37 percent through FY14, well below the assumed 8.5 percent, but
greater than the 5.88 percent calculated average over 25 years. However, the first two
years of interest payments were also borrowed, adding $266 million to the bond issue,
for a total of $2.277 billion (including issuing costs of $11 million). In addition, the debt
service payments are highly back-loaded, so the outstanding POB debt continues to
rise until FY22 – see Figure 5.29
[FIGURE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
It is fairly straightforward to add the outstanding POB debt to the UAL and to calculate
the counterfactual if the POB’s had not been issued. The result is depicted in the
orange POB line of Figure 6. Since the initial POB issue was $2.277 billion and only
$2.0 billion went to pay down the UAL, the FY08 figure is positive $0.277 billion instead
of negative $2.0 billion. The FY09 figure rises further, due to the large investment
losses that year. Since then the figure has drifted down, due to generally good
investment returns, but remains in positive territory as of FY14: the outstanding POB
debt of $2.333 billion outweighs my estimate of the UAL impact, -$2.088 billion.30
To summarize, comparing Figures 6 and 1, the main differences from the conventional
method are: (1) the inclusion of the POB debt; and (2) the substantially higher estimate
of the UAL impact of investment shortfalls, due to the more credible counterfactual of
amortization.
[FIGURE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

Conclusion
In this paper I have offered a methodological critique and replacement with substantive
implications for assessing the impact of investment shortfalls and other UAL-drivers.
The conventional method of calculating the UAL impact over time – simply summing the
annual actuarial gain/loss figures -- implicitly assumes that in the counterfactual
State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, as quoted by Alicia Munnell, et al., “Pension Obligation Bonds:
Financial Crisis Exposes Risks,” Center for Retirement Research, January 2010, p. 3. The actual bond
issue was quite complex – 15 current interest bonds (i.e. no principal paid until maturity) and 6 capital
appreciation bonds (i.e. no principal or interest paid until maturity) of different maturities and rates.
28
Authorized by P.A. 07-186, codified in Sec. 10-183qq of Chapter 167a, “Teachers’ Retirement System.”
29
The yearly outstanding POB balance is reported in the Annual Information Statement, State of
Connecticut, February 28, 2014, revised as of December 8, 2014, p. II-9. The annual sum of debt
service payments from the 21 bonds is not disclosed, but can be computed from the information given in
the initial POB disclosure, April 16, 2008.
30
Adding in the cumulative value of amortization payments saved and POB debt service paid makes the
result for the total impact of the POB a bit more positive (i.e. more adverse).
27
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exercise, amortization would adjust dollar-for-dollar with the interest on the UAL, unlike
the proportional adjustment of typical amortization formulas. As a result, this method
implicitly attributes much of the investment shortfall’s impact to the cumulative value of
amortization instead of the UAL. This can lead to a substantial underestimate of the
UAL impact, compared to that implied by actual amortization formulas. In cases where
the amortization formula is not funded, and contributions are simply what the budgeters
“can afford,” the underestimate is likely more pronounced, since the amount budgeters
“can afford” is even less responsive to the UAL.
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Figure 1: ΔUAL, Conventional Method, Ct Exogenous. CSTRS, FY00-FY14
adapted from CSTRS: market asset values, without midyear return on cash flows and accruals
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Figure 2: Counterfactual AMTt as Function of Counterfactual r*UALt-1
under Exogenous Ct, Exogenous αt, and Exogenous AMTt
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Figure 3: ΔUAL, AMTt vs. Ct vs. αt Exogenous. CSTRS, FY00-FY14
adapted from CSTRS. Selected Drivers. Consistent Counterfactuals.
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Figure 4: Impact on UAL and Cumulative Amortization. Ct vs. αt vs. AMTt exogenous.
adapted from CSTRS, FY00-FY14.
$14,000
investment
shortfalls
$12,000

$10,000

$ millions

$8,000

$6,000
contribution
shortfalls

$4,000
benefit hike

liability
shortfalls

$2,000
POB
$0

-$2,000

-$4,000
C

α

AMT

C

α

AMT

impact on UAL

29C

α

AMT

C

impact on cumulative amortization

α

AMT

C

α

AMT

Figure 5: CSTRS POB outstanding debt and annual debt service
$2,500

$400

$2,000
$300

$200
$1,000

$100
$500

outstanding POB debt (left axis) 30

annual debt service (right axis)

Source: Annual Information Statement, State of Connecticut, February 28, 2014; author's calculations

FY32

FY31

FY30

FY29

FY28

FY27

FY26

FY25

FY24

FY23

FY22

FY21

FY20

FY19

FY18

FY17

FY16

FY15

FY14

FY13

FY12

FY11

FY10

FY09

$0

FY08

$0

$ Millions

$ Millions

$1,500

Figure 6: ΔUAL + POB debt, αt Exogenous, CSTRS, FY00-FY14
adapted from CSTRS, supplemented by State of Connecticut Annual Information Statement.
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